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A.
NA'riONAL li.UTOMOBU,E AND CASUALTY INSUR1\NCE CO:;\IP ANY
STATE BOARD OF
lants.
[1] Estoppel-- Parties
will run
require it.
[2]
Affected-Governmental Agencies.-'fhe government may be estopped in tax
but the case must be
clear and the
[3] !d.-Parties Affected-Governmental Agencies.-Failure to
bail bondsmen
to and retained
for services in securor failure of the
of reports of
he may have
request (later
general, is not
the State Board of
insurance comretained by
their bail agents.
[ 4] !d.-Parties Affected-Governmental Agencies.-Generally,
failure to enforce statutes v.-m not estop a state agency from
their
enforcement
[5] !d.-Parties Affected-Governmental Agencies.--Failnre to
collect taxes which
under
though the
official thinks
should
is not sufficient for an estoppel;
See Am.Jur.,

H:Qhwmn

McK. Dig. References
[8, 9]

§ 408.

Brokers, § 187;

Court of Los
Actions for recovery of
plaintiffs reversed.
James E.
B.
Deputy

insurance
47 C.2d-13

sums.
the bail

It was

a
he has P make out an
of P 's bail. B
P on baiL

a!Juu""a"'vu

not uc•:oc;,"a'
a Receipt and Statement
a breakdown as follows :
"Bail Bond Premium ............... .
'' J:i'ee for Arranging Bond ........... .
'' Total Charges ................ .
Upon instructions of
the general agent, B will insert
the sum of $20 opposite the item 'Bail Bond
' and
$100 opposite the item 'Total Charges.' It is stipulated that
these were G's instructions to B, but it is not clearly established
that more than 75 per cent of the receipts were so broken down.
B, having satisfied himself that the security offered by P is in
all respects sufficient, posts a surety bail bond in the penal
sum of $1,000 and secures the release of P from jail. At the
end of the week during which this transaction was carried
out, B reports to G, the general agent or supervising agent, of
the surety company. B pays to G a consideration for the bond
determined by the contractual arrangement between B and G.
At the same time B deposits with G an additional sum as a
'reserve' to cover possible losses on the bond. G then reports
to S, the surety company, the total face amount of all bonds
written during the period covered by the report and pays to
S an agreed amount. G may also deposit an additional sum
as a 'reserve' to cover possible losses on this and other bonds.
S reports the sum of $20 or a portion thereof (there being no
uniformity) as gross premiums received on account of this
bond in its annual statement and in its
tax return
to the Insurance Commissioner." The taxes which were paid
under protest and awarded by the judgments were on the
amounts paid to and retained by the insurance companies'
agents who solicited and obtained takers of bail bonds. There

hence
which was taxed
this was held to be true even though the
retained a
of the
amount for his profit and
expenses. It is not questioned that the Constitution leYies taxes on the entire amount
but heretofore the state has been collecting taxes on only
the amount actually reeeived
the
Plaintiff companies contend that, as held by the trial court,
the state is estopped to collect taxes on those premiums for
the
years, J 947 in the instant cases. Defendants contend
there can he no
the state in tax matters;
that assuming estoppel is available, none was established here;
and that in any event interest on the taxes paid under protest
should not be allowed.
'l'here is no dispute as to the facts. At the close of 1947,
plaintif[s submitted reports to the state insurance commissioner
of their gross
* but did not include therein the
portion of the
reeeived by their bail agents as
discussed above
the Groves ease. The commissioner
made his
State Board of Equalization on the
basis of the
plaintiffs to him (see Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 12403) and the board assessed taxes on that basis against
plaintiffs
Rev. & Tax.
§ 12431 et seq.) and plaintiffs
paid those taxes in 1948. In 1B51, the state's attorney general
advised the commissioner that all the amounts received by
the bail
were taxable premiums and the commissioner
advised plaintiffs that au additional assessment was being
included in the 1951 assessments to inelude those amounts for
1947. The additional assessments were paid under protest
and recovery thereof allowed by the trial court.
The gross
tax law has been in effect since 1911, but
until 1951 no
company has
the entire amount
received by its bail agents. In
licenses were required
for bail agents and section 1800 was added to the Insurance
*Those reports are required by law.

(Rev. & Tax. Code,

9 12276.)

Ii'.2d 798 see disenssion
L.Rev. 71; 21 Univ. of
it is the unusual
tax cases; the
must be clear and the
authorities last
) . This is indicated by the
rules in the field. "The
of taxation shall never
be

particularly in tax matters. As a
proposition this
is sound law. Obviously, a tax administrator should not be
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lose its revenues
administrative official
An
law.
which is in conflict with the statute
is invalid and the
is not bound thereby. [Citations.] The
of the tax officials is to collect taxes imposed
by law . . . it is
no defense that taxes were not
paid when due in reliance on an official
of nonliability.
'fhe
is deemed to act with knowledge that administrative officials cannot bind the
by their erroneous
interpretation of tax statutes.' ''
[3] The facts here do not establish a clear case of estoppel
and injustice necessary in tax cases. The failure to collect
the tax or object to the sufficiency of the reports of gross
premiums made by plaintiffs, although the commissioner
thought possibly they were insufficient as shown by his request
(later withdrawn) for an opinion from the attorney general
is not enough. The request to the attorney general for an
opinion was not known by
; all
knew was that
no objection was made to their reports and taxes were not
collected on the entire premiums received by them. [4] Generally ''. . . failure to enforce statutes of this state will not
estop a state agency from their subsequent enforcement ( Caminetti v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 52 Cal.App.2d 321, 326 [126
P.2d 165] . . . )." (Richfield Oil Corp. v. Cmwford, 39 Cal.
2d 729, 736 [249 P.2d 600] .) [5] The failure to collect
taxes which are payable under a statute, even though the
official thinks they should be, is not sufficient for an estoppel.
(See Goodwill Industries v. County of Los Angeles, supra,
117 Cal.App.2d 19; La Societe .Franeaise v. California Ernp.
Com., supra, 56 Cal.App.2d 534; El Domdo Oil W arks v.
McColgan, 34 Cal.2d 731, 739 [215 P.2d 4]; Gaylord v.
Commissioner of Int. Rev., 153 F.2d 408; 40 Va.L.Rev. 313;
Hotel Kingkacle v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 180 F.2d 310;
Mt. Vernon Trttst Co. v. Cormnissioner of Int. Rev., 75 F.2d
938.) And it has been held that an estoppel will not arise
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6,
the Insurance Commissioner in Los Angeles,
1Yith regard to
regulations governing the
transaction of bail bonds and the conduct of hail
and
the approval by the Insurance Commissioner of
certain forms of documents to be used in the transaction of
bail bonds." 'l'his
apparently was an investigation
of the bail bond business and the matters considered were in
the nature of police regulations for that business. Nothing
was said about taxes and the commissioner was interested in
having the
to bail bond applicants advise them
as to where the money he paid for the bond was going. ·while
the
and listed '
' as the item
which
actually
it could be referring only to
net premiums rather than gross premiums upon which the tax
is levied. There is no necessary relation between the receipt
so given and taxes. Taxes >Yere not mentioned. [7] The
eommissioner had authority to adopt rules and regulations
for the conduct of hail bond business (Ins. Code, § 1812; see
Smith v. Downey, 109 Cal.App.2d 745 [241 P.2d 618)) which
have to do with the conduct of the business rather than taxes.
(See Ins.
§ 1800 et seq.) [8] In regard to taxes
the insnranee eompanies must make a report of their gross
premiums to the commissioner (Hev. & 'l'ax. Code, § 12276)
and the eommissioner makes a report to the State Board of
Eqnal ization of the
received
eaeh insurer ( icl.,
§ J 2403). 'l'he board assesses and levies the tax
§ 12431)
and
notice thereof to the insurer
§ 12435) and they
are to be paid to the state eon troller
§ 12624). Probably
the eommissioner has authority to question the reports of the
insurers to him but the tax is assessed by the board.

and McComb,
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P.2d 1034]

could reasonably rely. I do
not concur in any
that as a matter of law an
estoppel cannot be invoked by a taxpayer as against the government's claim for a deficiency, if in fact the taxpayer relied
upon an administrative representation and as a result lost
the opportunity to pass the tax on to others.
a distinction must be recognized between the
case wherein the taxpayer acts as a mere collection agent,
and that in which a tax is imposed directly on the taxpayer.
The unemployment insurance tax illustrates this distinction:
the employer withholds a certain sum from the salary of his
employes, as to which he acts as a collection agency only;
he also remits a sum based on the total salaries paid, as to
which he is the principal taxpayer. In such a case, if the
taxpayer is informed by the proper authority that certain
employes are not subject to the tax, and therefore no remittances are made with respect to the salaries paid to such
employes, and if the authority later changes its position and
declares a tax due, the government may be able to collect the
amounts the employer should have paid on his own account,
but it will not be allowed to recover from the employer the
amounts which should have been withheld from the employes'
salaries. (Garrison v. State (1944), 64 Cal.App.2d 820 [149
P.2d 711] ; La Societe Francaise v. California Emp. Com.
(1943), 56 Cal.App.2d 534 [133 P.2d 47] .)
Where a taxpayer has refrained from paying a tax for which
he is primarily liable because of reliance upon an erroneous
administrative interpretation, it has been held in a number of
cases that he must pay an asserted deficiency, even though he
would have been able to pass on the tax had he not relied
on the administrative position that no tax was due. (Market
St. Ry. Co. v. California State Board of Eqttalization (1955),
137 Cal.App.2d 87 [290 P.2d 20]; Duhame v. State Tax Com.
(1947), 65 Ariz. 268 [179 P.2d 252, 171 A.L.R. 684]; Crane
Co. v. Arizona State Tax Com. (1945), 63 Ariz. 426 [163 P.2d
656, 163 A.L.R. 261]; Bennetts, Inc. v. Carpenter (1943), 111
Colo. 63 [137 P.2d 780].) Inspection discloses, however, that
the Duhame and Bennetts cases are of little weight in California. In Duhame the court disposed of the estoppel question
by saying that ''there can be no estoppel against a government
or governmental agency with reference to the enforcement of
taxes" (p. 260 of 179 P.2d); similarly, in Bennetts the court
merely stated that "It is a general principle of law that the
doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked against any govern-
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Crane case, and the Crane case
made in La Societe Francaise .
supra, 56
on the
Societe Francaise case, as noted
involved an
insurance tax, and in that case the
employer was held liable for the amounts he would have paid
had the employes been properly included on its tax return,
although not for the amounts which should have been withheld
from the salaries of the particular employes. The Market
Street l{ailway ease (involving the sales
represents a
square California holding by the District Court of Appeal
that no estoppel will be raised merely because the taxpayer
had a right to pass on the taxes to the purchaser, where he
was under no statutory duty to do so, even though the only
reason he failed to pass on the tax was because of reliance
on the erroneous administrative ruling. But the principal
basis of the Market Street Hailway case is in ultimate analysis
(through the Crane
the Societe Francaise case.
The true theory of the Societe Francaise ease seems to
appear at page 555 of 56 Ca1.App.2d, where the court stated:
" . . . in the 'present c:ase a proper
for the protection
of the interests of the government in its revenues, with recognition also of a degree of responsibility on the part of the
government to a taxpayer who has relied to his prejudice on
an official ruling, is achieved by
the taxpayer to discharge that part of the tax burden which it was contemplated
it should bear by the statute imposing the tax, while relieving
it from liability for the employees' contributions and interest
on delayed payments. The
win pay from >its own
funds as much as it would have paid
btd for the
erroneous administrative
bnt it will not pay more."
(Italics added.) But La Societe Francaise is essentially a
nonprofit organization and there was no showing that it
could have passed on its costs to its customers. In a similar
ease, where the employer was an insurance company, the court
relieved the taxpayer of liability both for the employes' share
and for the employer's share of the tax. (Garrison v. State of
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Dana' where the
as that followed
the District
Garrison ease, declared that "\¥here
it appears that it is
policy that an administrative officer should
a decision with retroactive effect, it
is the court's
to curb his powers so as to serve
that
")
is to be assessed only for the
amount whieh it would have paid from its own funds in the
absenec of relianee upon the erroneous administrative aetion,
then it is ineonsistent to eharge it for an amount which would
have been passed on to, and borne by, the ultimate consumer
had the tax been properly levied. This is espeeially true with
respect to insurance companies, whose annual premium rates
are a refleetion of their
and anticipated operating costs.
'l'hns it appears that a
agency may be estopped
to assert a tax
where the reason for the original
nonpayment was reliance OJJ an administrative representation
which proved to be erroneous, if the taxpayer can show that he
could and vvould have passed on the tax to his customers had
he not relied em the ruling that it was not due, and that he
can no longer so pass it on. Here, if the representations which
were made by the state insurance commissioner had instead
been made by the state board of equalization, a different result
would be indicated.
For the reasons and subject to the limitations above stated I
concur in the
concurred.
Respondents' petitions for a rehearing were denied December
1956.

